ABSTRACT
ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING THE CONCEPT OF CBMS DIPANKER BANERJEE* CBMs are as old as history. Over the years these have developed as powerful tools to avoid conflict, build confidence, help resolve
core issues and build peace. The peculiar conditions in strife torn South Asia have prevented developing effective measures in the region. In spite of the fact that there are in South Asia a number of competent think
tanks and research institutions, their purpose till now has been to promote national strategic interests rather than ameliorate conflict.
Much work has been done elsewhere in the world on developing CBMs, particularly in Europe and Southeast Asia. This region can learn from these
experiences and adapt them as necessary to fit the particular requirements of South Asia. The types of CBMs that may be adopted and the role of research institutes to bring this about have been comprehensively discussed
in the paper. Confidence Building measures (CBMs) are like the
Salaam and the Namaste. They are also as old as history. Both are expressions of respect and goodwill, a measure of transparency demonstrating that no arms are carried and that the interaction is meant to be harmless.
The gesture is often accompanied by a smile and conveys feelings of cordiality if not friendship. At the least, it signifies no ill will and no immediate threat to the other person. It may lead to a pleasant parlay or,
it may merely be an empty gesture meaning nothing at all of substance, only a formal expression of courtesy. Military CBMs too could perhaps be just that, yet recent experiences around the world have demonstrated that
it could also be much more. To be more than mere gestures of goodwill, CBMs have to be carefully developed incremental steps, covering a wide spectrum of issues, encompassing many disparate elements that satisfy the
essential security requirement of the participants, yet be effective enough to be useful. CBMs received a boost and acquired legitimacy largely after the end of the Cold War. Till then, the global emphasis was on arms control, both to prevent conflict and to develop
conditions that would enable prospective protagonists to feel comparatively secure. This view was predominant from the 1950's till the mid 1980's, when control over arms and forces were seen as a more relevant and
urgent requirement to reduce the possibility of conflict and minimize the resultant devastation, if one were to actually break out. It was only after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which initiated a steady though
halting process at CBMs in Europe that it became apparent that reducing the intensity of conflict was not enough and that an attempt had to be made to prevent its possible outbreak and bring about reduced spending on
defense. It is in this that CBMs score over arms control. * Executive Director, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. List of Abstracts
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