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ABSTRACT
NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE POST-KARGAL SCENARIO RAJESH M. BASRUR* The Kargil episode, to many, appeared to underline the necessity of institutionalized arrangements to bring stability to the
nuclear-strategic relationship between India and Pakistan. It seemed to justify the anxieties of those who labeled the region "the most dangerous place on earth." This is not an objective view. While the risks
associated with the possession of nuclear weapons remain considerable, and while the importance of arms control ought not to be understated, it is necessary at the same time to retain a sense of balance. The basis of
serious and effective arms control cannot be the assertion of a simple unilinear relationship between the possession of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war. Rather, it is necessary first to identify those
factors that are conducive to nuclear arms control and those that are not. In this paper, I will examine the sources of instability that are likely to hinder the establishment and implementation of specifically nuclear confidence building measures
(NCBMs). I then focus on the sources of stability that are conducive to nuclear arms control. The picture that emerges shows that the factors favoring arms control carry greater weight than those that do not. In the
concluding section, I draw attention to the fundamental importance of nuclear doctrine. Doctrine is in many ways the basis of arms control, for it is constructed on the building blocks of path-setting beliefs and
preferences about conflict and cooperation in the world around us, the role of nuclear weapons in the world thus defined, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of force architecture, and, consequently, the scope for
arms control. Thus, an essential prerequisite for the establishment of successful NCBMs is a comparative analysis of the nuclear doctrines of the two countries.
Director, Center for Global Studies, Mumbai, India.
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