Seminar on: IMPLICATIONS OF THE 13TH SAARC SUMMIT

PROGRAM

ABSTRACT
RESOLVING AN IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT IN A PLURI
NATIONAL SOCIETY: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION EXPERIENCE IN SRI LANKA
SUMANASIRI LIYANAGE

Ted Robert Gurr once wrote that ethno-political conflicts are not just about resources or power but about protecting group status, culture and identity. He added that “identity and belief are non-negotiable” (1994: 365). President George Bush, speaking from a different perspective warned: “let no one think that there is an easy or simple solution to [this] tragedy that results from “age-old animosities” (New York Times: 1992). Edward Azar depicted conflicts as protracted and intractable social conflicts the source of which were the denial of basic social needs including distinctive identity and the social recognition of that identity (1986: 28-29). However, the dictionary definition of the term ‘intractable’ indicates that such conflicts are “stubborn or difficult but not impossible to manage” (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 2004: 7). Hence the argument that although identity and belief are non-negotiable, “the means by which they are protected can be and have been the subject of creative compromises” becomes credible (Gurr, 1994: 365).
Do these compromises bring about a resolution of conflict that, according to Zartman, means “the elimination of causes of the underlying conflict” or just management of them?’ Tradition means of conflict management involves such strategies as denying both sides the means of combat; neutralizing one party’s means by slightly increasing the other’s; separating the combatants in space or time and substituting fighting with conferences to ‘talk’. Management therefore seeks to prevent conflict from erupting into a crisis or to cool a crisis at the point of eruption (Zartman, 1985: p.8- 9). It is interesting to note that different schools of thought reject the possibility of permanent resolution of ethno-political conflicts positing instead that they “can be contained”, but “cannot be entirely resolved” (Lake and Rothschild ,1996: 42). In many instances, the main focus of conflict management and indeed resolution, was on the so-called root causes of conflict and how they can be addressed. This is based on a rather simplistic view of conflict. As experience in many conflict situations has shown, the discursive distinction between “conflict-as-start up condition” and “conflict-as-process” may be a useful paradigm here as different start-up conditions may lead to the same or different conflict processes. As Sandole aptly remarked, “[c]onflict resolution theory should take into account conflict-as-process as well as conflict-as-start up conditions, with the recognition that, over time in the development of any particular conflict system, the emphasis may shift from start-up to process as the dominant driving force” (1999: 131). However, it is imperative to address these ‘start-up conditions’ at every step of the conflict management/resolution process.

This paper takes this discursive distinction as its point of departure. Sri Lanka is depicted as a classic example for protracted social conflict. Since the ethno-political conflict escalated into an internal war in 1983, many attempts have been made by the parties to the conflict with the objective of its resolution or management with and without mediation by international actors. Notable international interventions in the conflict include the role that India (Until 1990) played in conflict ‘creation’ as well as conflict resolution. Since 1998 Norway, with the assistance of other international players acts as the facilitator of the peace process. In Sri Lanka, it appears that the management efforts (2002-2005) were relatively more successful and long-lasting than the resolution efforts (1987 and 1994-5). However, the paper argues that the failure to address the ‘start-up conditions’ at multiple levels may allow old ‘specters’ to haunt us time and again, resurrecting the conflict in a new form with each set of efforts. This paper also argues that it may be misleading to see the conflict process as singular and homogeneous. It is a combination of many processes operating at different levels. Conflict management may seem more effective since it addresses primarily bilateral issues where the security of the state and non-state actors become predominant. The Sri Lankan experience shows that ‘other’ processes especially at multilateral and grass root levels, if neglected, streamlined or marginalized, would become disruptive to the management effort.

*Paper presented in an International Workshop on Conflict Management Mechanisms and the Challenge of Peace organized by the Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi in collaboration with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad at the Arts Auditorium on November 26-27-2007

** South Asian Institute, Colombo, Sri Lank