PROGRAM

ABSTRACT
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT IN
IRAQ
JUSTIN ALEXANDER

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

Although Iraq has been the highest-profile conflict in recent history, it is still widely misunderstood and presented in simplistic terms of occupation versus resistance or internal sectarian conflict. Although there are important sectarian dimensions to the conflict in Iraq, it is much more complex than a simple three-way contest between Kurdish, Arab Sunni and Arab Shia groups. There are both serious divisions within the ethno-sectarian blocs and unexpected alliances between them. Much of the violence also has non-political motives such as crime, revenge and tribal disputes. An examination of the changing tactics of the United States, the most powerful party to the conflict, over the five years of war helps to illuminate the changing nature of the conflict and provide a context for the various conflict management mechanisms that have been attempted.

Barriers to resolution

Conflicts are typically resolved through a decisive military victory, a mediated solution involving compromises by all parties, or a unilateral cessation of hostilities by parties who are no longer willing or able to continue fighting. None of these scenarios is likely to evolve in Iraq in the near future. This is because of a variety of reasons including:

1. External involvement by countries with internal agendas;
2. Criminals and others gaining wealth and power from the chaos;
3. Extremists who are unlikely to negotiate;
4. The long-term culture of violence.

Mechanisms for conflict management

Parties such as the US-led Coalition, the United Nations, the Iraqi government and non-governmental organisations have attempted various mechanisms for conflict management. These range from grassroots initiatives to ease sectarian tensions to major security operations. The mechanisms discussed here can be categorised into:

1. Violence reduction;
2. Formal security initiatives;
3. Political processes;
4. The involvement of the international community.

CONCLUSION

The past failures in Iraq may shed some light on how to more effectively manage the conflict in the future, and offer lessons for other countries facing intractable conflict.

** Paper presented in an International Workshop on Conflict Management Mechanisms and the Challenge of Peace organized by the Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi in collaboration with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad at the Arts Auditorium on November 26-27-2007

** Independent research on Iraq based in the United Kingdom