PPSCR

Dept.of Intl Relation, University of Karachi

Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution

DECEMBER 22-23, 2001 - CONFERENCE ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI

ABSTRACT

NUCLEAR CBMS' DEBATE IN SOUTH ASIA: AN ANALYSIS

ZAFAR NAWAZ JASPAL*

In summer 1999, the threat of nuclear weapons use prevented extension of limited border war (Kargil) into on all out war. But it failed to bring a significant change in the military postures of both India and Pakistan. Therefore, the dangerous strategic competition is dominating the security paradigm of South Asia. Moreover, the strategic thinking in India and Pakistan is strongly committed to use strategic nuclear assets as instruments of retribution in case nuclear deterrence fails between them.

Nuclear weapons are intrinsically indiscriminate, and suit to terrorists' new emerging trend- to inflict large numbers of indiscriminate casualties and attract more attention. Repudiating the use of nuclear weapons by the terrorists groups because of its technical difficulty is an erroneous approach. The distinction must be drawn between the kind of military weapons, which states strive to develop and the coarse types of devices which terrorists would be satisfied with. The uses of nuclear weapons know how and targeting of nuclear installations for terrorism is also a possibility in South Asia. The terrorists could disperse a nuclear radioactive substance in terrorist incidents. Concurrently, they can hit nuclear installations with conventional explosive materials or by highjacked commercial aeroplane.

The security debate in South Asia is dominated by military and political standoff between India and Pakistan. The available literature indicates that they are debating and emphasizing the nuclear weapons competition, the nuclear doctrines, and the horrendous consequences of the failure of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Ironically, t he Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical terrorism even fails to catch the attention of academic debate in the region.

Many analysts concluded that Nuclear Confidence Building Measures (NCBMs) approach between India and Pakistan is a practicable solution to the nuclear flash point in South Asia. The NCBMs between India and Pakistan increase openness and transparency in military activities and in arms acquisitions, thus increasing the predictability of each other's actions and behavior. Under the NCBMs arrangement, normal military activities would not mistakenly perceived as threatening. In addition, military activities that do pose a threat are immediately identifiable as out of the ordinary, allowing time for a state to seek clarification or react militarily if necessary.

 The failure of the United Nations to resolve Kashmir issue, prevailing South Asian security environment and the strategic nuclear equilibrium between India and Pakistan make NCBMs between them imperative for their national interests. The national interests of both neighbors oblige that they should seriously develop understanding intended for avoiding lose-lose situation in their bilateral relations.

* Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

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