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YUGOSLAVIAN
CONFLICT AND EUROPEAN MEDIATION
BY TEHMINA ZIA
DEFINITION AND CONCEPT OF MEDIATION
Since the end of the Cold War, new sources and type of conflict have emerged
that challenges the common definition of mediation as a process in which
“a third party helps the parties [to a conflict] find a solution
which they cannot find by themselves”. Within intra-state conflicts
that involve a number of military and paramilitary groups, even identifying
the authorities that direct the warring can pose a problem. Firstly in
order to be successful, mediation is usually expected to engage the parties
in constructive dialogue to facilitate an exchange that incorporates the
different interests and to work towards an outcome acceptable to all sides.
BRIEF HISTORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavia was created after World War I drawing in the former Austro-Hungarian
possessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina. Serbia
was the largest and dominant unit. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
was proclaimed in January 1946. It was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia in 1963. The main language, Serbo-Croat, is spoken by both
Serbs and Croats. Catholicism is mainly to be found among the Croats and
Slovenes; and Islam, among Muslims and Christianity, among the Serbs,
Montenegrins and Macedonians; and Islam, among Muslims and Albanians.
The Wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration began in summer 1991.The
last decade of the 20th century SAW FOUR Balkans wars: Slovenia (1991),
Croatia (1991) Bosnia (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-99). The EU’s
efforts in last decade have been directed towards providing the basis
for reconciliation and reconstruction and to promote democratization and
economic growth.
After the death of Communist dictator Joseph Broz Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia
plunged into an economic and political crisis; old ethnic and religious
tensions were causing strains between the six constituent republics. In
1990 free elections were held in all the republics, resulting in the return
of nationalist governments. On 25th June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared
their independence from Yugoslavia.
CROATIA AT WAR
Meanwhile the hostilities in Croatia had escalated into war between Croat
defense forces and Serbian paramilitaries backed by the Yugoslavs National
Army’s (JNA). The war was to continue until the ceasefire was declared
in January 1992, by which time the JNA and Serb forces were in control
of virtually all Croatia’s ethnic Serb areas. In the same month,
the member states of EC, pressed by Germany but with grave reservations
expressed by Britain and France, agreed to recognize Croatia’s and
Slovenia’s independence. The month following EC recognition of Croatia’s
independence, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), established as an interim
arrangement to bring about the conditions in which the EC Conference could
peruse peace and security, was deployed in the country.
WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
After a referendum boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnia and Herzegovina
declared its independence in March 1992, supported by the Bosnian Muslims
(who now called themselves Bosniacs) and Croats. The EC granted recognition
the following month. In August 1993 the Bosnian Croats declared a ‘Republic
of Herceg-Bosna’, with its capital in Mostar and, following a ceasefire
in February 1994, joined the government forces in a Muslim-Croat Federation.
THE DAYTON ACCORD
In September 1995 the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and the FRY
met in Geneva where they agreed to negotiate a US-sponsored peace accord.
Fighting ceased on 22 October and, in November, all parties were summoned
to Dayton, Ohio, where a settlement, the so-called ‘Dayton Accords’,
was reached. Bosnia was to remain a single state with a division of territory
between the Bosnian and Croats Federation (51%) and the Republika Srpska
(49%). The enforcement of compliance with the civil aspects of the Accords
(principally construction and governance) was entrusted to EU and the
Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with the EU
providing major funding.
ROLE OF EUROPE AS A MEDIATOR IN YUGOSLAVIAN CONFLICT
The EC dispatched a “troika” of Foreign Ministers to mediate
and negotiate a cessation of hostilities pending a general agreement for
a peaceful resolution of Yugoslavia’s political and constitutional
problems. An agreement was brokered (the ‘Brioni Agreement’)
putting an end to hostilities in Slovenia and calling for further negotiations
among all the Yugoslavs Republics.
The EC Conference on Yugoslavia, chaired first by Lord Carrington and
later by Lord Owen, had been given the twin task of mediating ceasefires
and negotiating between the leadership of all the republics to reach a
constitutional settlement. By the autumn of 1991, however, it had become
clear that the Conference was having great difficulty in achieving twin
tasks. The EC began to see a more significant role for the UN as the likely
key to success in both tasks. The London Peace Conference in August 1992,
which made only limited progress, was the last major solo initiative of
the EC. Through its special envoy, Cyrus Vance, the UN now put on the
mantle of co-sponsorship of the peace process. The EC would no longer
be seen as the lead organization in the effort to bring the Yugoslav conflicts
to an end. In order to control the situation after the wars began in Slovenia
and then in Croatia in July 1991 the EC imposed trade sanctions against
all areas of Yugoslavia as a part of its diplomatic efforts at mediation;
in another attempt to bring politician to the table.
The reason to choose economic sanctions fall into three unrelated categories.
- The first was Western unwillingness to use military force. Although
West Europeans agreed that the Yugoslav conflict was insignificant to
their security and vital interests, they chose to mediate it to demonstrate
their capacity for a common EC foreign policy.
- The second reason was the Western explanation for the conflict. Sanctions
aimed to dissuade the leadership in Serbia from this course, by isolating
it an international pariah, by making it economically ever more difficult
to continue assistance to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- The third reason was to protect the authority and instruments of intervention
in the face of failure.
To the extent that purposes were defined, the sanctions failed.
CONCLUSION
From that point of view, the European Community (now EU) and the United
States committed a great error when they recognized Croatia, Slovenia
and later Bosnia independence; instead they should supported efforts to
strengthen the Yugoslavian federation. The European Community initially
treated the conflict on a European level, but lacked the diplomatic and
military means to intervene effectively or issue credible threats. The
EC-UN mediatory efforts that took place 1992 and 1994 were similarly unsuccessful.
PREPARED BY TEHMINA ZIA
CLASS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
B.A (HONS) IIIRD YEAR, 2003
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