CONSEQUENCES OF IRAQ WAR ON TURKEY

BY SARWAT JABEEN

The Turkish leadership has finally agreed to allow a substantial number of American troops, 20,000 or so at a time as they rotate through -- to be stationed on its soil in order to invade Iraq from the northern front. In a few days, the Grand National Assembly is likely to be presented with a bill authorizing both foreign troops within its boundaries, and authorizing Turkish military forces to deploy, following American troops into Iraq.
Turkish authorities have been struggling against this outcome for the past several months, for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the government of Prime Minister Gul and the ruling justice and Development Party leader Erdogan has represented itself as more democratic, more responsive to the public than many of its predecessors. And Turkish public opinion is almost unanimously opposed to war -- between 80 and 90 percent in most polls. Both the political and military leaderships have also consistently expressed their opposition to a war with Iraq. For the political leaders, it is both against their constituent’s preferences, and a distraction from an ambitious agenda of domestic reform. The Gulf war extracted a massive economic price from Turkey, from which its economy has not really recovered –and the prospect of another crisis is hardly appealing when the dismal state of the economy is at the top of most Turk’s demands on their government. On Turkey’s eastern border with Iraq, home to many of its Kurdish people, the embargo of trade with Iraq with Iraq with Iraq has brought particular hardship, eradicating one of their few sources of income. For the military, the prospect of the emergence of a Kurdish political entity on their border raises the specter of a re-emergence of Kurdish separatist activity within Turkey, recently an issue being addressed more in political terms as Turkey moves towards European Union standards. For these reasons, the Turkish leadership has equivocated, dodging and weaving under diplomatic pressure from the U.S for months. Why have they finally compromised, giving in to outside pressure?
For one reason, that pressure has been incredibly intense. The U.S has unleashed a virtual barrage of continuous, high-level visit from the Department of state, Department of Defense, the joint Chiefs: at the head of government level, the meeting between President Bush and government party leader Erdogan also addressed the issue of Turkish cooperation with U. war plans. The U.S has offered economic assistance that would partially alleviate the costs to Turkey of a war. Turkey’s recovery program under the IMF, which was thrown off course last fall as the collapsing government tried to spend its way to re-election, has been linked in to the U.S effort of ‘persuasion’. For another reason, Turkey has been a close U.S ally for decades, within the auspices of NATO, creating a close relationship between the Turkish and American military structures. For a country in a dangerous neighborhood, the continuance of this alliance is quite important. In addition, the U.S recently went to bat for Turkish ambitions to joint the European Union, lobbying intensively in Europe on their behalf prior to the recent round of decisions on E.U enlargement, which finally did give Turkey a date for the commencement of accession negotiations. The Turkish-American alliance has been important, and honored both sides. Large issues were at stake, and the American ability to apply pressure was fully deployed.

What pushed Turkey over the edge? Two things, primarily. First, with a very mixed diplomatic stance in the Europe to which turkey aspires, the policies of EU members is diverse enough that Turkey is not condemning itself to non-member ship by co-operation with the U.S. This is still allows for the eventual possibility of EU membership, an over –riding goal of the government. Second, the U.S. agreement to go back the United Nations Security Council prior to the initiation of war provides some diplomatic cover for Turkey, as has its own intense diplomatic efforts to arrive at an alternative solution among Iraq neighbors. But fundamentally, the level of frustration on the American side at Turkey’s intransigence in the face of U.S war planning had risen substantially. The suggestion that the Defense Department was planning for a “Do it without Turkey” option was most likely the final straw. In that case, not only would Turkey suffer the economic consequence of an Iraq war, but their military would not be able to insure what they considered a favorable outcome relative to the Kurds in Iraq. That the decision was taken after a six hour long meeting of the National Security Council -- the body that integrates Turkey‘s political and military leaderships, suggests this is the core rationale.
CONCLUSION
Turkey was set on a track that was in most regards a positive one. It has a newly-elected government with wider support than any for years; the focus on economic recovery as a centerpiece promised relief for a population struggling for the recent past; movement towards entry into the European Union put increased human rights and decreased military influence high on the agenda, both real needs for Turkey. Now, the government seems poised to act in the face of overwhelming public opinion. This can do little to reassure a skeptical public that its leaders respect public opinion. In the event of war, the economy will suffer another set back, despite the aid the U.S. is offering, Turkey pays the cost of military deployment, refugee treatment, and general economic dislocation in the region. Finally, the elevation of security issues has brought the military back to center stage, increasing their clout and more hard line approach on a number of issues, potentially including negotiations on Cyprus.
None of these results are positive for Turkey; all reverse recent promising trends. Turkish democracy is the first casualty of the impending Iraq war.

PREPARED BY SARWAT JABEEN
B.A. (HONS) IIIRD YEAR, 20003
CLASS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

All content (C) Department of International Relations, Karachi University

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