CAUSES OF UN INTERVENTION IN THE SOMALIAN CONFLICT
SABIHA SHABEER*

Background
Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa and borders on Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Today’ Somalia has resulted from the unification of the northern province of British Somaliland and the southeastern province of Italian Somaliland in 1960. Despite the separation of the Somali people during the colonial era, they remain one of the most homogenous and cohesive of Africa’s peoples. Somalis also live in parts of the neighboring states and their attempts at unification have been a source of conflict.
After years as Italian and British colonies, Somalia gained its independence in 1960. Siad Barre assumed control of the country in a dictatorship. Aideed spent the late 1960s and early 1970s in prison for planning a coup against Barre. Barre eventually freed Aideed and made him ambassador to India, Sri Lanka and Singapore.
By 1990, Barre's dictatorship had crumbled, and he was deposed. Aideed became a prominent leader of the United Somali Congress (USC), one of the rebelling factions. USC Somalian ex-patriates in Italy then proclaimed Ali Mahdi President of the Republic of Somalia, a claim recognized by very few inside the country.
The United Nations opened an office in Mogadishu a few months after Aideed routed Mahdi's forces. The U.N. Representative realized he was too late to mediate between the two factions, and concentrated on reducing the famine in southern Somalia.
There were some causes for which UN involved in Somalia conflict. The primary objective of UN Involvement in Somalia is to maintain peace environment and controlling law and order situation in Somalia. Another reason of UN involvement over there to control the problem of improper distribution of Aid in Somalia. USA has some own interest which persuaded UN to involve at Somalia conflict. There were some local powers acting at Somalia and to reduce their powers in Somalia big powers of world forced UN to enter in that disputed zone.
The U.N. Secretary General wanted a more visible role and fired the representative. The new leadership declared Somalia an anarchy, Aideed a bandit, and firearms the problem. The U.N. then embarked on a military occupation of Somalia and an attempt at full disarmament of its population, with the intent of re-establishing a Western-style central government.
The U.N.'s expensive campaign resulted in more violence, as the Somali tribes fought to preserve their traditional systems and their right to self-defense.
On June 5, 1993, U.N. troops attempted to shut down Aideed's radio station because it was broadcasting "propaganda" (that is, anti-U.N. messages). In a victory for freedom of speech, Somali militiamen repelled the attack, in the process killing 23 Pakistani U.N. troops.
The Somalis' successful repulse of the U.N. attack led the United States to commit the lives of U.S. troops to an expensive, bloody, five-month manhunt for Aideed. Dozens of U.S. and U.N. troops, and hundreds of Somalis, were killed. In October 1993, the U.S. ended the search after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and some of their corpses dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.
During the weeks from June 5 to October 3, 1993, U.N./U.S. forces inflicted 6,000 to 10,000 casualties on the Somali resistance, said Eric Schmitt in the December 8, 1993, New York Times. Schmitt confirmed the account with U.S. military intelligence, relief workers, U.N. officials and the U.S. special envoy to Somalia. U.S. Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni estimated that two-thirds of the casualties were women and children.
Only a small fraction of the money spent by the U.N. on "relief efforts" -- the equivalent of hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars -- actually benefited Somalis. Most of the money was spent on the U.N./U.S. effort itself, according to the November 28, 1993, Los Angeles Times. Foreign businesspeople profited immensely from such items as fast-food sales to occupying soldiers, a $9-million sewer system in the U.N./U.S. headquarters and helicopter flights for Western officials. Those in power are concerned with money and power, not the noble ideals to which they pay lip service.
In March 1994, U.S. and other Western troops withdrew from Somalia, and by March 1995 the remaining African and Asian U.N. troops withdrew. The fighting subsided after this. In September 1995, in a major military move, Aideed and six hundred militiamen siezed the southern Somali city of Baidoa.

Conclusion
Perhaps UN thinks that it has all the solutions to make the peacekeeping in any disputed zone that is why UN involves in any domestic and internal problems of countries and it is observed that UN involves itself in countries where big powers have any sort of interest. But it failed in Somalia because in Somalia, UN ignored all the traditional principals of peacekeeping and distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement became blurred.

* Student, M.A (Previous) Department of International Relations, University of Karachi

All content (C) Department of International Relations, Karachi University

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