CONSEQUENCS OF WAR UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA WITH REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN
NIDA SEHAR*

The emergence of the nuclear genie out of the closet in South Asia altered the very nature of war in this region. Among the dangers associated with the development of India and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities is the possibility of an accidental nuclear war involving these two nations. With the enormous destruction power of nuclear weapons and the urban density of human population in south Asia, the consequences of such a war would be horrific. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan could result in 12 million deaths. according to a estimate that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 nuclear weapons it is believed India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48., Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft.

Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10 South Asian Cities
For this scenario I used casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in Pakistan. The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe injuries experienced at Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from ground zero. Other factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the structural characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the victims at the time of the attack. The closer to ground zero, the higher fatality rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of injuries. The table below summarizes the nuclear war scenario by superimposing the Hiroshima data onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely concentrated populations.
Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities
City Total Population Within 5 Number of Number of Persons Number of Persons
Name Kilometers of Ground Zero Persons Killed Severely Injured Slightly Injured
India
Bangalore 3,077,937 314,978 175,136 411,336
Bombay 3,143,284 477,713 228,648 476,633
Calcutta 3,520,344 357,202 198,218 466,336
Madras 3,252,628 364,291 196,226 448,948
New Delhi1,638,744 176,518 94,231 217,853
Total India14,632,937 1,690,702 892,459 2,021,106
Pakistan
Faisalabad2,376,478 336,239 174,351 373,967
Islamabad798,583 154,067 66,744 129,935
Karachi 1,962,458 239,643 126,810 283,290
Lahore 2,682,092 258,139 149,649 354,095
Rawalpindi1,589,828 183,791 96,846 220,585
Total Pakistan9,409,439183,791 1171,879, 614,400 1,361,872
India and Pakistan
Total 24,042,376 2,862,581 1,506,859 3,382,978

Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities. During the Cold War, the two primary antagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, were separated by an ocean. Missile flight times to their respective countries--25 minutes--allowed, through the use of satellite monitoring, enough time for a rational response. With respect to India and Pakistan, there is approximately a 2-5 minute warning once a missile is launched, which allows almost no time to make a thoughtful decision. Even if delivery was made by airplanes instead of missiles, the situation would still be grave. A key factor affecting the possibility of miscalculation or accidental detonation of nuclear weapons is the number of those weapons. Simply put, the more weapons there are, the more difficult it will be to control them. Therefore, the number of actual nuclear weapons in each country’s arsenals must be controlled. It is possible that both countries would be willing to adhere to such controls given their stated commitments against engaging in a nuclear weapons race.

Why Weaponization Should Be Avoided ?
An important measure that India and Pakistan must take is a decision not to conduct additional nuclear tests. Testing creates a psychological climate of immense fear. The recent tests have destroyed years of patient work by citizens of both countries attempting to build a climate of harmony. A no-testing pledge can take a number of forms including the CTBT or a bilateral agreement between the two countries. India and Pakistan must agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. A number of additional confidence-building measures could be taken between the two countries to stabilize the situation. These include hot-lines of communication, flag meetings, and flights over respective territory to monitor troop movements. Stabilizing Nuclear Relations Ultimately, the danger of nuclear war in South Asia is here to stay. Although it can be argued that the mutually assured destruction (MAD) strategy between the United States and the former Soviet Union was hardly a "safe" form of deterrence, deterrence as practiced in the subcontinent is never going to be as "safe" as it was during the Cold War. As the Cuban missile crisis has proved, even a well-established nuclear deterrence between these super-powers can be vulnerable. In essence, in the absence of movement toward nuclear disarmament in the subcontinent, which is a very remote possibility at the present time, the focus should be on stabilizing the nuclear relations between India and Pakistan. One way of achieving such stability will require technology that decreases the chances of unauthorized use and of accidental detonation. One such technology is called permissive action links (PALS). These are electronic circuits wired into a bomb and do not allow activation except under very particular circumstances. They are connected directly with the appropriate authority by radio so that conspiracies can be worked against why India and Pakistan could maintain nuclear deterrence without actual weaponization. According to this participant, improved command and control (C&C), and not weaponization, is necessary for deterrence and for crisis management. . Of course, PALS is not a perfect answer or absolute assurance of nuclear security or stability. At a point where weaponization and consequently readiness is reached, there is more threat to the stability of the region and less room for negotiating flexibility. Once a country is weaponized, it is harder to think of how not to make use of them.

SOURCES
• www.blackvault.com
• www.defencejournal.com
• www.nrdc.org/nuclear
• www.ceip.org

* Student, B.A. (Hons) IIIrd Year, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi.

All content (C) Department of International Relations, Karachi University

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