CRISIS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
By MOBIN AKHTAR

Discussants characterized Northeast Asia as relatively stable and increasingly integrated economically, even though they acknowledged the possibility of major shocks, such as collapse of the North Korean regime or serious, prolonged friction in US-China relations. Paradoxically, one factor contributing to this stability is uncertainty over the future. Uncertainly over China’s directions, the regional impact of a reunified Korea, and the continued relevance of the U.S. alliance structure has created an anxious climate in which all countries have a stake in maintaining the security status quo, or at least avoiding its disruption. At the same time, all countries hedging against this uncertain future by actively pursuing additional options and source of security in the event the status quo changes. The result has been marked increase in high level diplomatic and understanding but thus far does not provide sufficient common ground for institutionalized multilateral security mechanisms.
STABILTITY IN THE FACE OF CHANGE
The most significant discontinuity would be a North Korean collapse, which experts agreed is clearly possible with in the next five years, although some viewed it as a near certainly while others judged it improbable. A China-Taiwan conflict would also have major implications for regional security, and would probably accelerate regional state’s growing interest in stronger national defense capabilities.
With or without major regional shocks, several longer-term trends and factor will gradually alter regional relationship, and over the long term, possibly the balance of power. The most important factor is what path China will take as it modernizes and increases its power. Some specialists argued that China will in inevitably try to reshape the region in ways more beneficial to China’s interests, although how it will try and its where withal to succeed are uncertain.
THE US AS A WILD CARD
Uncertainty over the US role also exists, but not in its previous form of fear of the US military disengagement. Current doubts have more to do with the opaqueness of US interest than with the US military presence, and how this perceived unpredictability might be manifested in various regional scenarios. Some in the region, for example, see the potential for US forces to become nuclear or WMD “hostages” instead of deterrents, with the US prone to quickly recalculate its national interest in the face of potentially steep American casualties. Others worry that a strong US effort to develop missile defenses in the region could sharply exacerbate differences, especially with China.
Specialists were divided over the repercussions of Kosovo. Most agreed that China has been profoundly affected, the Kosovo air war has graphically illustrated Chinese military weakness across the board, lending to a sense of impotence and frustration. But lessons being drawn by Japan and Korea are more speculative. Some argued that it is dangerous to make too much of foreign interpretations of Kosovo or any other US military action-reactions are always mixed and depend on a state’s relationship with the US. Others argued the Kosovo could be a catalytic events, reinforcing uncertainty over US interests, the perception that the US is fundamentally Eurocentric, and opportunities for new alignments-most immediately, between Russia and China.

EXTERNAL ACTORS
The climate of hedging that will mark the next five years increase the potential role of extra-regional actors, particularly Russia and India. Some cautioned that it is dangerous to write off Sino-Russia co-operation as relatively insignificant due to their fundamental differences in national interests. The current environment provides each state ample reason to focus on their common interests, not their differences, the Russian card is a useful and potentially lucrative card for China [and others] to play politically and in terms of defense acquisitions, despite well founded concerns about Russian reliability.
India as well is poised to play a growing role in East Asia, and its relationship with China will be an important factor in the region’s security landscape. China now takes India more seriously than in the past, but the US has been slow to consider the implications of a growing India role in East Asia. Some experts believe that the rise of India, combined with the recovered, active Russia, could lead to a shift in the regional center of gravity away from the traditional China-Japan-Korea axis to a China-Russia-India focus. Russia and India are potential flanking powers that could be pivotal elements of a new balance of power structure over the long-term.

ECONOMIC LINKAGE
The economic picture is somewhat at odds with the security trends. Economic integration is much more advanced than political/ security relations in Northeast Asia. As a result of the Asian economic crisis and continued US prosperity, the US in the near term has growing economic influence in the Northeast Asia. Two potential adverse macroeconomic factors to watch are how Japan pulls out of its recession [e.g., at the expense of South Korea and other potential competitors] and economic trends in China, particularly whether China becomes less market-friendly. China’s long term energy needs could also affect its strategic posture, and the growing percentage of Middle East oil going to East Asian consumers could also lead to shifts in foreign policy priorities, especially given the decline of ASEAN and the power vacuum in Southeast Asia caused by Indonesia’s protracted crisis.

PREPARED BY: MOBIN AKHTAR
CLASS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
B.A [HONS] 3RD YEAR, 2003

All content (C) Department of International Relations, Karachi University

Website designed and maintained by Techdorado Web Technologies Inc.
Disclaimer Email Webmaster, KUIRD.org