CHINA’S DIPLOMACY DURING THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR, 1971

MEHREEN KHAN

The outbreak of the East Pakistan crisis in March 1971, gave rise to certain political issues of internal importance such as those of separation, East Pakistani displaced persons, foreign intervention, and external armed aggression. The Chinese official attitude towards the crises and the issues arising out of it, was made public for the first time on 12th April, by Prime Minister Chou En-Lai. In this letter China considered the ‘happening in Pakistan is purely its internal affair, to be settled by Pakistani people without foreign interference.
Throughout the period of the crisis and the ensuing Indo-Pakistan war. China consistently followed the policy it had adopted in April. The principles of this policy were reiterated and the pledge of support to Pakistan was reaffirmed in November when Mr. Bhutto visited Peking as the personal representative of President Yahya Khan.
The Chinese viewpoint regarding the crisis was stated in a speech by Mr. Chi Peng-fei. Acting Foreign Minister, which was later endorsed by Premier Chou en-lai. China reiterated its previous pledge that ‘should Pakistan be subjected to foreign aggression’.
China would ‘resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to defend their State sovereignty and national independence’.
During the Indo-Pakistan war, which began on 22nd November, when the Indian army crossed into East Pakistan, China remained in constant contact with the government of Pakistan, reaffirming its support to Pakistan and denouncing India and the Soviet Union on various occasions.
China’s support to Pakistan and the denunciation of Indo-Soviet collusion became more pronounced during the war. This was apparent also from the speeches made in the United Nations. While extending support to Pakistan, China consistently emphasized the principles to which it adhered. At the same time China repeatedly recalled what the Soviet Union had done in Czechoslovakia, and India in Tibet and Kashmir.
China’s support to Pakistan was not confined to verbal criticism of the Indo-Soviet role but was also practically demonstrated in the UN. China moved a draft resolution (which it later withdrew) which condemned India, asked the warring parties to withdraw their troops, and called upon ‘all states to support Pakistan’ in its struggle to resist ‘Indian aggression’. China voted for the General Assembly resolution of 7th December and the Security Council resolution of 21st December calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. However, it expressed its dissatisfaction with the resolution in that it did not condemn India and support Pakistan against the India’s aggression. It expressed its solidarity with Pakistan by strongly opposing the Soviet proposal to invite a ‘Bangla Desh’ representative to take part in the UN debate and by vetoing the Soviet resolution that called for a ceasefire without withdrawal. Had China not been a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet resolution of 5th December which secured two affirmative votes of Moscow and Poland with twelve abstentions, would have been passed. Thus China’s presence in the UN proved a source of strength for Pakistan.
The last important official statement made by China on the Indo-Pakistan war came on 16th December. Although it was issued on the day on which the Pakistan forces surrendered in East Pakistan, it appears that at the time of issuing the statement, China did not know about the surrender. China’s stand on the basic issues involved, i.e. non-intervention, Indian aggression, and the Soviet role in the war, remained the same. Apart from that there were some significant points pertaining to the situation in the statement.
Chinese said Pakistan was willing ‘to seek a political solution... in the spirit of understanding and cooperation’.
China’s reaction to the occupation of Dhaka by the Indian army was reflected in Premier Chou’s meaningful remark that the ‘fall of Dhaka is…the starting point of endless strife on the South Asian subcontinent and of their (the Indians’) defeat’. That this was a reassertion of the 16th December statement shows how and with what purpose China was looking at the changed situation in the subcontinent.
It is evident from the statement of 16th December that China’s support was not only moral and diplomatic but practically it comprised material assistance also. After the suspension of arms supply to Pakistan by the US and other Western countries, Pakistan had no alternative but to lean heavily on the Chinese source. Since the US embargo, China had been Pakistan’s main supplier in the period 1966-71, during which it had provided Pakistan with 133 million dollars worth of arms. After the crisis, China supplied ‘all the weapons and ammunition’ that Pakistan needed. Not only that, but some were supplied free.
The major factor that prevented direct Chinese involvement in the war was the existence of the Indo-Soviet treaty. Article 9 of the treaty provides for holding mutual consultations and ‘taking appropriate effective measure,’ in case any of the parties ‘is attacked or threatened with attack. The treaty, on the one hand, strengthened China’s support to Pakistan; on the other, it confirmed the Soviet entry into the war on India’s side, in case of China’s intervention. ‘India could not have liberation Bangla Desh (without) the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.
China could not help more actively because it had always opposed the use of force to settle disputes. Even its disputes with the USSR and the United States it wanted to settle by pacific means on the principle of peaceful coexistence. All Chinese statements and speeches about the Indo-Pakistan dispute carried an appeal for negotiations and its peaceful settlement.
To sum up, it must be said that China supported Pakistan as much as was possible for it to do so. The extent and nature of the support varied according to the prevailing situation. The support was friendly but cautious in the initial period of the crisis, stronger and more practical, though short of physical intervention, in its final phase. That China will continue to be a helpful friend of Pakistan is evident from the Sino-Pakistan and Sino-American joint communiques, With the Indian occupation of East Pakistan, the balance of power in Asia had been upset. China faced two adversaries, to its north the USSR and to its south India, which is heavily depending upon soviet arms to maintain its dominance in the subcontinent. The USSR, most likely to use this dependence to encircle China, is also making moves towards Tokyo for this purpose. Time will show the Chinese reaction to this new development. It is not without significance that there has been an increase in the activities of the Naxalites, who are believed to be ideologically akin to the Chinese.

MEHREEN KHAN
CLASS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

All content (C) Department of International Relations, Karachi University

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